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Crime, Punishment, and Legal Error: A Review of the Experimental Literature
Kathryn Zeiler1 and Erica Puccetti2
August 2018

1. Introduction
When individuals violate the law, detection and verification of the violation are
rarely, if ever, perfect. Before the state can dole out punishment, it must first
identify a suspect and then produce sufficient evidence to persuade a judge and/or
jury beyond some threshold level of confidence that the suspect, in fact, violated
the law. The court might be uncertain that the state has the right person. If the
suspect is undoubtedly the one who caused the harm, the court might be unsure
about whether his act constitutes a violation of the law (e.g., whether the suspect
was, in fact, speeding). The state, given the level of resources allocated to law
enforcement, might not be able to produce a suspect.
Limitations on enforcement resources lead to imperfect detection. Evidence
production and proof problems cause both mistaken convictions and mistaken
acquittals.3 Errors have many sources, including hindsight bias,4 lack of complete
information about the defendant’s possible options and chosen action,
untrustworthy eyewitness testimony, the admission of impartial evidence in trials,5
and unwillingness or inability to expend resources on detection,6 among others.7
We focus here not on the sources of errors, but rather on their effects on deterrence
and punishment policy. 8 Our purpose is to briefly summarize the theoretical
1
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Lack of detection of wrongdoing might be viewed as a type of mistaken acquittal. We
note, however, that some analyses view these two phenomena as importantly distinct from
one another. In addition, the use of “type I” and “type II” errors is common in the
literature, although the terms are used inconsistently. For this reason, we prefer “mistaken
conviction” and “mistaken acquittal.”
4
See, for example, Fischoff 1975; Baron and Hershey 1988; Casper, Benedict, and Perry
1989.
5
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6
See, for example, Becker 1968.
7
See Gould and Leo 2010.
8
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literature that studies the effects of legal errors on crime and punishment rates, and
to critically review studies that report on experiments conducted to test such
theories.9 The theoretical literature includes analyses of both criminal law and civil
law violations, and so we cover both here.10
Experimentalists have tested relevant theories in a variety of contexts. We limit
our review to theft game experiments, where players handing out punishments are
not victims of the crime. Theft game players are assigned to just one role, either
judge or potential law violator (citizen, criminal, and so on). Fines are not costly to
judges, at least in monetary terms.11 This rules out experiments using public goods
games that allow players to impose costly punishment on non-contributors.
Researchers who attempt to test theories using field data face formidable
obstacles. Much of what is required is unobservable. Data on the number of crimes
committed, the amount of resources and effort spent on detection, and rates of
wrongful convictions and acquittals are impossible to observe in the field. The lack
of randomization of detection efforts, punishment severity, and burdens of proof
lead to troublesome selection effects. Despite these difficulties, a great deal of field
research has been conducted.12 Given the limitations of the field, data generated in
the lab can help to increase confidence, or call into question, theories constructed
to explain and predict behavior.
While the lab is well suited to solve some of the identification problems that
plague researchers working in the field, it is not a perfect tool by any means. It
comes with its own substantial limitations. For example, it’s impossible to impose
severe levels of punishment, such as hefty fines that go well beyond endowments
handed out in the lab. Imprisonment of any significant duration is certainly not an
option. For this reason, it’s impossible to test theories that assume or predict severe
penalties such as fines equal to the convict’s total wealth. Even testing the effects of
varying substantial fines is difficult. At most (at least in the U.S.), we are limited to
taking only (or not much beyond) what the subject earned or was given during the
experiment and ending the subject’s ability to gain additional payouts during the
experiment. This and other limitations are discussed, and their implications are
explored.
This is not the first review of the experimental literature. Engel (2016)
summarizes a wide array of experiments. Our review is much narrower in scope
and offers a critical perspective. We attempt to synthesize experimental results to

9

We draw on theoretical literature summaries by Garoupa (1997) and Prescott (2016).
We use language associated with crimes throughout the review. The reader should read
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11
Some have studied the effects of allowing law enforcers to profit from delivering
punishment. See, for example, Xiao and Tan (2014).
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10

2
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250393

Note: This is an incomplete working draft. Please do not cite without authors’
permission.

get a sense of the main take-aways and to generate a roadmap for further
exploration in the lab.
Part 2 summarizes theories offered to explain and predict how imperfect
detection and guilt-determination errors affect crime and punishment rates. Part 3
summaries, synthesizes and critiques experimental studies designed to test the
theories. Part 4 catalogs, in broad terms, where we are and offers ideas for
potentially fruitful avenues for continued exploration in the lab.
2. Theory
2.1. Becker’s Theory of Optimal Enforcement and Early Responses
According to standard economics models, one will choose to violate a legal rule if
one’s expected benefits of doing so outweigh the expected costs.13 Perhaps the
most salient expected cost is punishment, the likelihood of which depends on three
factors: detection, successful prosecution, and punishment enforcement. If the
judicial system is able to perfectly determine guilt and detection always leads to
prosecution, then one will expect to suffer the cost of punishment if (1) one violates
a legal rule, (2) that violation is detected, and (3) punishment is enforced.14 Becker
(1968, n.55) suggested that enforcement costs could be saved by increasing the
severity of punishment beyond the harm resulting from the violation.15 In effect, this
implies that enforcers can reduce total social costs by reducing enforcement costs
to near zero. While reducing enforcement would otherwise greatly increase the
likelihood of mistaken acquittal (in the form of imperfect detection), increasing
punishment severity maintains the expected cost of crime, which acts to keep
would-be criminals in line.
Becker’s approach led to a flurry of responses, all of which claimed that
Becker’s analysis missed crucial factors. Harris (1970), for example, argued that
efficient crime policy must account for social costs imposed both by mistaken
convictions and mistaken acquittals. Becker suggests increasing the probability of
detection to reduce losses from crime or, if doing so is costly, imposing harsher
punishment. If, however, social costs arise from unjust punishment and detection
mechanisms are not perfect, Harris argues that these social costs must be balanced
against the costs of crime and might call for reduced levels of detection and
punishment and greater legal safeguards to prevent mistaken conviction. In other
words, as long as uncertainty over guilt exists, justifying extreme punishment is

13

See, for example, Becker (1968), which applies standard economics concepts to crime.
We use “guilt” to refer both to violation of criminal or civil laws.
15
Becker (1968) did not take up the issue of guilt determination errors.
14
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difficult. 16 Erlich (1982) points out distributional considerations missing from
Becker’s (1968) analysis. For example, if detection is unlikely and punishment
severe, most will face no punishment and the few unlucky detected criminals will
pay a huge cost. Erlich refers to this as ex post inequality. Like Harris, he also
argues that any analysis of optimal crime policy must include the costs of mistaken
convictions.
The following subsection summaries a number of theoretical models that more
formally analyze the implications of mistaken convictions.
2.2. Early Theories Of Mistaken Convictions
A number of theorists extended Becker’s model to illuminate the implications of
mistaken convictions. Stigler (1970) was perhaps the first to point out that
mistakenly punishing the innocent might result in higher crime rates. In the
extreme, if the innocent will be punished with certainty, then committing crimes
that produce benefits of any size is optimal. More generally, the risk of being
mistakenly punished decreases the marginal benefits of maintaining one’s
innocence. Stigler also analyzed the relationship between punishment severity and
choice over crimes. He noted that when criminals chose from a continuum of
crimes, higher punishments might compel more harmful crimes (e.g., if my hand
will be cut off when I’m caught stealing $5, I might as well steal $5,000).17 The
generality of this result, Stigler notes, depends on actions potential victims might
take to prevent crime. Specifically, when criminals assess their options, they
consider steps owners of relatively large sums of cash might take to deter theft.
Stigler notes that self-protection mechanisms might reduce the likelihood of highdollar crimes.
Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987) consider the use of policy to improve the
accuracy of guilt determinations. Their model assumes defendants use trials to
signal their innocence or guilt. They find that optimal choices of standards of proof
and punishment severity can minimize the probability of mistaken convictions and
mistaken acquittals and total litigation costs of defendants. They employ a standard
signaling model to show that these two policy levers can be used to increase the
court’s ability to infer guilt or innocence from defendants’ litigation efforts.
Grady (1983) analyzed the effects of perceived error in court guilt
determinations on the rate of legal rule violations. He focused not on judicial error
16

Harris also points out the complexities that arise from the fact that different classes of
persons might perceive costs of punishment and costs of crime differently.
17
Malik (1990) points out that we can solve this problem by lowering the probability of
detection as punishment severity is increased. Assuming risk neutrality, we can use both
levers simultaneously to keep the expected cost of crime constant but lower detection
costs. For more on the impact of risk preferences see infra.
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but on potential litigant error in predicting court determinations of violations of
duties of care. He assumes that courts do not err in determining breach, but that
potential injurers sometimes fail to perfectly predict whether their choice of
precautions will trigger a court determination of breach in the event an injury
occurs and a negligence suit is pursued. Unlike previous models, his analysis
predicts that, assuming such errors, efficient precaution taking will not be
encouraged by the standard negligence rule adopted in economic models, which
assumes that the defendant breaches his duty of care if his chosen precaution falls
below the level of precaution that minimizes the sum of expected harm and
precaution cost. Grady (1983, 821) proposes a revised rule aimed at encouraging
efficient choices over precautions, a rule he claims courts actually apply in
practice.18
Png (1986) analyzes errors courts make in determining guilt, considering their
effects both on behavior given a decision to engage in risky activity and on the
decision whether to engage in a risky activity in the first instance. Png assumes a
positive probability of both wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions, that
precautions are costly, and that the choice over precautions is binary. Assuming
risk neutrality, Png finds that optimal choices over both precautions and activity
levels can be encouraged by increasing damages and by offering a subsidy for (or
imposing a tax on) activities, depending on the probabilities of wrongful
convictions and acquittals. Under this set of assumptions, he finds that both
wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions reduce deterrence and thus compel
an increase in punishment severity (in other words, increased damages).19 The logic
behind wrongful acquittals is straightforward—the lower one’s likelihood of
detection or conviction given detection, the more severe the punishment must be
to push expected costs of rule violation above expected benefits. The connection
between wrongful convictions and deterrence is consistent with Stigler’s (1970)
intuition. As the chance of a wrongful conviction increases, the marginal cost of
violating the law decreases. Ignoring social costs of wrongful convictions, Png
argues that the possibility of wrongful conviction suggests that Becker’s
recommended increase in punishment severity to account for low detection rates
might not go far enough. To the extent that punishment can be made even more
severe, enforcers should increase its severity to account for the possibility of
wrongful convictions.
18

The details of the rule, which hinge on a complex relationship between the tort elements
of breach and causation, are beyond the scope of our analysis. See Polinsky and Shavell
[2000] for a summary of results related to civil liability contexts.
19
Png assumes that the two types of errors affect deterrence in the same way. Polinsky and
Shavell (2000), in their summary of the literature on optimal enforcement in the face of
imperfect detection and guilt-determination errors, report this result among others
summarized here. Polinsky and Shavell (2007) provide a similar summary.
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Kaplow and Shavell (1994) develop a model to examine optimal enforcer
choices over sanctions and methods to improve accuracy of both conviction and
acquittal decisions. Their insight is that detection rates and accuracy rates are
substitutes in the battle to reduce crime rates; thus, optimal law enforcement will
depend on the relative costs of increasing detection and increasing accuracy. The
model produces two main results. First, like Becker (1968), they find that increasing
costless sanctions will maintain deterrence while allowing detection and judicial
accuracy cost savings. While Becker recognizes potential limits on sanctions,
Kaplow and Shavell argue that, if imposing sanctions is costless (for example,
imposing an easy-to-collect fine), the optimal sanction is the maximal feasible
sanction—the entire wealth of the convict.20 Second, if sanctions are costly (for
example, a prison term), then the enforcer should increase accuracy and reduce
enforcement costs relative to a costless sanction environment. Like Png (1986),
Kaplow and Shavell ignore social costs of wrongful convictions.
Around the same time, a number of studies considered wrinkles that might alter
basic predictions of the early models incorporating mistaken convictions. The
following subsection highlights a number of refinements.
2.3. Enforcement Model Refinements
2.2.1. Risk Preferences
Polinsky and Shavell (1979) analyze the effects of risk aversion on choices over
whether to comply with legal standards. They show that any adjustment to
punishment to account for a positive probability of wrongful acquittal (in the form
of failed detection) needs to account for the risk preferences of potential law
violators. For example, if potential violators are risk averse, increases to damages to
account for a low probability of detection need not be as high as Becker (1968)
suggests based on the assumption of risk neutrality.21 In fact, by holding back on
damages, Polinsky and Shavell argue that we gain social value by reducing the cost
of bearing risk imposed on potential violators. They also find that, if both wrongful
convictions and wrongful acquittals are possible, risk aversion leads to ambiguous
results on the optimal sanction.
2.2.2. Jury Preferences for Justice

20

Becker (1968, n.55) admits that sanctions in excess of the value of the harm are
necessary when the probability of detection is less than 1. Becker (1968, 195) explicitly
rejects, however, tying the penalty to the convict’s wealth.
21
Kaplow and Shavell (1994) find a similar result. They also find that optimal sanctions
might rise or fall as mistaken conviction and acquittal rates increase.
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Until the early-90s, economic analyses of criminal law and deterrence focused
mostly on choices over enforcement expenditures and severity of sanctions by
officials aiming to minimize the sum of enforcement costs and costs imposed by
criminals on their victims. Andreoni (1991) explored the effect of severe
punishment on the willingness of judges and jurors to convict when guilt is
uncertain. Specifically, Andreoni noted that severe penalties might make
conviction less likely because jurors are reluctant to impose harsh punishments in
the face of uncertainty about guilt, especially in cases where the burden of proof is
high (for example, beyond a reasonable doubt). Such reluctance changes the
enforcer’s calculus. Increasing the severity of punishment given such reluctance to
convict might lead to lower convictions rates and, consequently, higher violation
rates. This calls into question Bentham’s (1914) general claim that regulators and
courts should increase penalty severity to balance the effects of low detection
rates.22
Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) extended the standard model by exploring
potentially divergent objective functions of different parties involved in the
enforcement apparatus. In particular, they suggest that jurors might care more
about justice than they do about deterrence, which could compel them to apply a
high evidentiary standard (regardless of the legal standard) when deciding guilt.
They assume that justice is maximized when the likelihood of wrongful conviction
is minimized; thus, jurors apply high evidentiary standards to reduce the
probability of convicting the innocent. They offer an extreme example to make the
point. If only one person had an opportunity to commit a perpetrated crime, but the
jury is uncertain about who committed it, to maximize deterrence it should convict
anyone charged. 23 This result follows from Png’s (1994) insight that mistaken
convictions decrease deterrence; but, as Schrag and Scotchmer point out, this is
true only for those with an opportunity to commit the crime. The choices of those
without an opportunity to commit the crime will not be affected by the possibility
of wrongful conviction. If, however, jurors aim not to deter but to minimize
wrongful convictions instead, then they will resist convicting, and deterrence will
be suboptimal. 24 They propose allowing into evidence what courts generally

22

Feess and Wohlschlegel (2009, 71) formalize this claim and find that “deterrence
maximizing punishments are increasing in the quality of information the jury gets.”
23
Schrag and Scotchmer refer to these types of crimes as “exclusive.” They also consider
non-exclusive crimes (those that many have an opportunity to commit). For these types of
crimes, wrongful convictions decrease the deterrent effect to a larger extent than for
exclusive crimes. They also consider environments populated by two different types of
citizens, some who enjoy high benefits from crime and others who gain less in benefits.
24
They assume that the jury’s objective function, which focuses on justice, is not in line
with society’s objective function, which focuses on deterrence. They also explore the

7
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250393

Note: This is an incomplete working draft. Please do not cite without authors’
permission.

consider prejudicial information about the defendant’s character, and they suggest
that if those charged are more likely to have criminal records, the information
about character will increase the conviction rate and, as a result, increase
deterrence.25
2.2.3. Criminal Reactions to Enforcement Policies
Calfee and Craswell (1984) call attention to the link between the law violator’s
actions and the likelihood of being found guilty.26 They predict, like others, that
increases in punishment severity might alleviate the undesirable effects of wrongful
acquittals and failed detection on deterrence. In cases where the risk creators’
actions are tied to the likelihood of being found guilty, however, the authors
predict that risk creators will over-comply when they are uncertain about whether
they will be held accountable. Increasing the severity of punishment, they warn,
only exacerbates this inefficiency. Calfee and Craswell show that Bentham’s (1914)
argument that punishment should always be increased to reflect the likelihood of
non-detection is valid only when certain conditions hold.27 When the potential
injurer chooses from a set of continuous actions, such as choosing a driving speed,
and the potential injurer’s choice affects the likelihood of a guilt determination
such that risk creators are encouraged to over-comply, then increasing penalties to
compensate for uncertainty in detection might lead to even higher levels of overcompliance. They, like Grady (1983), suggest changing legal rules to directly
reduce uncertainty, such as employing bright line rules instead of standards,
although they caution that such rule changes might trigger other costs.
implications of juries that are more likely to convict those with criminal records in an effort
to punish them for undetected crimes.
25
For a comprehensive analysis of the role of evidentiary rules in guilt determination
errors, see Posner [1999]. Posner assumes that errors in guilt determinations impose a
social cost and that costly expenditures to procure evidence reduce the likelihood of such
errors. He invokes the intuition from Png (1986) that both wrongful acquittals and wrongful
convictions decrease the deterrent effects of the law, and, like Kaplow and Shavell (1994),
predicts that greater accuracy in guilt determinations will enhance deterrence.
26
In addition to legal system errors, they consider other sources of uncertainty including
mistaken predictions about where the court will set the legal standard, whether a legal
proceeding will be pursued, and the magnitude of the punishment. Shavell (2009)
develops this point further. [search for second Calfee and Craswell article that produces a
similar result]
27
The conditions are: (1) when the potential injurer makes an either/or choice rather than a
choice from a continuum with an interior optimal point; (2) when the choice is from a
continuum and the choice is independent of the probability of detection and litigation; and
(3) given a set of choice conditions, under-compliance is more likely than over-compliance
(Calfee and Craswell 1984, 996).

8
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250393

Note: This is an incomplete working draft. Please do not cite without authors’
permission.

Malik (1990) considers reactions by criminals to severe penalties and their
implications for optimal crime policy. [more here]
2.2.4. Distinguishing Error Type
Strandburg (2002)—assumes that errors depend on one another; increase in
accuracy has ambiguous effects on deterrence. [more here]
Similar to Schrag and Scotchmer’s (1994) basic intuitions related to exclusive
crimes (that is, the choices of those without opportunities to commit the considered
crime will not be impacted by the probability of wrongful conviction), Lando
(2006) draws a distinction between two different sources of wrongful conviction for
nonexclusive crimes (in other words, everyone has an opportunity to commit the
crime). The first source is a court finding that the defendant violated the law while
acting, when in fact his action complied with the law (“mistaken act evaluation”).
In this case, the usual result holds if the act is binary.28 When the court is mistaken
about the wrongfulness of the act, both mistaken conviction and mistaken acquittal
reduce deterrence. The second source is a court finding that the defendant
committed a criminal act that was actually committed by someone else (“mistaken
identity”). When the court is mistaken about identity and the probability of
mistaken act evaluation is zero, mistaken convictions based on an identity error
will not affect choices of those who might be mistaken for the perpetrator. This is
because mistaken conviction based on identity is equally likely both when one
violates the law and when one decides to comply. Importantly, Lando implicitly
assumes that the likelihood that one will be mistakenly acquitted is independent of
the likelihood of someone else being mistakenly convicted of one’s crime. Lando,
thus, highlights the importance of considering the error type when analyzing the
effects of errors on deterrence.
Garoupa and Rizzolli (2011) call into question Lando’s conclusion. They point
out that whenever a misidentified defendant is mistakenly convicted, the actual
perpetrator is mistakenly acquitted. Thus, the probability of mistaken acquittal is a
function of the likelihood that someone else will be found guilty of one’s crime. In
the extreme, if the jury always convicts the wrong person, then everyone who
benefits from committing a crime will commit it. Garoupa and Rizzolli therefore

28

The act is binary if the choice set is {commit the act, do not commit the act}. Lando
reminds us of Calfee and Craswell’s (1986) qualification related to continuous choice sets
(for example, how fast to drive). In these cases, if the choice impacts the likelihood of guilt,
then actors are encouraged to be overly cautious. Mistaken guilt determinations exacerbate
this effect.
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conclude that convictions based on mistaken identities will, in fact, reduce
deterrence.29
3. Experiments (and Theory Development)
3.1. Criminal Preferences
Some of the first experiments designed to explore reactions to changes in the
likelihood of detection brought to light factors beyond expected punishment that
might keep potential law violators in line.
In one of the first lab experiments in the field, Alm, McClelland, and Schultze
(1992) considered tax evasion rates given low levels of detection and found
evidence of overestimation of low detection rates and a willingness to comply due
to preferences for the provision of public goods. Subjects were endowed with
various incomes and told to decide how much income to report. They were told
that they must pay a tax on all reported income and that, with some positive
probability that varied within subject across multiple rounds, a penalty equal to
fifteen times the unpaid tax would be imposed if they did not report all income. To
test whether subjects might be influenced by the public-goods benefits that arise
from taxes, all collected taxes and penalties were put into a group fund, increased
by some multiple, and distributed equally among all subjects at the end of each
round. To avoid introducing negative connotations, the loaded words “evasion”
and “tax compliance” were not used during the main experiment.30
It is important to note at the outset that the design features deviate from the
assumptions of the general deterrence models. First, evidence suggests that subjects
view money given to them by the experimenter as different from their own money.
This “house money effect” can reduce the disutility subjects experience when they
lose amounts during the experiment.31 Second, penalties are limited by the amounts
subjects obtain during the experiment. General experimental protocol frowns upon
(and in some cases forbids) the taking of money not endowed during the

29

Garoupa and Rizzolli employ an equilibrium model of the supply of and demand for
errors to derive their conclusion, though it seems that simply assuming the likelihood of a
wrongful acquittal is a function of the likelihood of a wrongful conviction of another for
one’s crimes is sufficient to obtain the result.
30
Some treatments were run with the loaded terminology to test for its effects, however,
and no differences in choices were observed. This suggests that results reported in previous
experiments that used the loaded terms might not have been tainted in any way by the
suggestive language.
31
Cite to basic house money effect literature.
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experiment.32 Experiments in such environments are not effective tests of theories
that assume criminal penalties go beyond gains from the crime that triggered the
penalty.
The results suggest that at least some individuals place excessive weight on low
probability events as assumed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and that some
pay taxes because they value public goods funded by tax revenues. When the
subjects were told that the probability of detection was zero, average group
compliance was 20%, suggesting forces other than probability overweighting were
at play. The authors do not tell us whether subject choices and payouts were
anonymous. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that subject choices were at
least partly driven by the desire to avoid signaling to the experimenters or other
subjects a willingness to break the law. That said, the results suggest that choices
might be driven at least in part by systematic overestimation of low probabilities of
detection and preferences over public goods produced through compliance. While
the experiment environment is not in line with assumptions of theories of crime
and punishment, which assume that criminals pay penalties out of total wealth and
not just the profits from their crimes, the results provide some insight into factors
that might influence criminals’ choices.
Block and Gerety (1995) report results suggesting that, in the face of uncertain
likelihood and severity of punishment, convicts react differently from a deterrence
standpoint from the general population. Becker (1968) and others have noted that
convicts tend to be risk seeking. In contrast, ample experimental evidence shows
that the general population is risk averse. This implies that convicts, when deciding
whether to commit a crime, might be more sensitive to changes in the certainty of
punishment than to its severity, while the general population might be relatively
more sensitive to changes in punishment severity.
Block and Gerety (1995) collected data from two samples, one drawn from a
prisoner population and another from a college student population. All subjects
participated as sellers in binding auctions over multiple rounds. Subjects were
assigned costs of production—the same across all subjects—and asked to report the
lowest price at which they would be willing to sell a “make-believe commodity.”
The seller reporting the lowest price sold a number of units indicated by a
predetermined demand function and received compensation equal to the number
of units demanded multiplied by the per-unit profit (price minus the per-unit
production cost). All other subjects received nothing. In some rounds, subjects
were allowed to communicate, which provided an opportunity to collude. In
others, subjects could communicate with each other but were told they would
32

Generally, human subjects committees in the U.S. forbid net experimental earnings to be
negative. [add cite] Journals outside the U.S., however, do not always require authors to
obtain human subjects committee approval, and negative payoffs are, therefore, possible
(see, for example, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, 67).
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suffer a monetary penalty of some (varying) size with some (varying) probability if
the experimenter detected collusion (that is, if the reported prices exceeded the
cost of production). 33 The findings supported the assumptions related to risk
preference differentials between prisoners and students. In the rounds forbidding
communication, prices converged to the production cost. In the unpunished
collusion rounds, prices generally converged to the monopoly price, implying that
subjects successfully colluded. In rounds imposing varying punishment with
varying probability, students generally displayed aversion to risk while the
prisoners engaged in risk-seeking behavior, in line with predicted differences. Thus,
the results suggest the existence of heterogeneous risk preferences when wrongful
acquittal is possible.34
Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2002) designed an experiment to study
choices in environments in which bribes are possible. They focused on three
drivers of behavior: beliefs over reciprocity (in other words, if the enforcer is
bribed, he will reciprocate), known costs imposed on third parties (citizens incur
corruption costs), and fear of detection and punishment.35 To test other-regarding
preferences, bribers in some treatments were told that all other subjects
participating in the experiment would suffer a small loss if a bribe were accepted.
To test fear of punishment, bribers in some treatments were told that they faced a
0.003 probability of detection, which would result in a loss of all money made
during the experiment and the end of opportunities to earn more during the
experiment. Subjects did not know when others were detected and essentially
ejected from future rounds, and payouts were made anonymously at the end of the
experiment. The results reject the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences will
reduce bribes. Costs imposed on others did not affect the crime rate. On the
punishment front, the possible loss of all winnings reduced (over all rounds) the
number of bribes despite the overall low probability of sudden death 36 and
subjects’ underestimation of the probability of detection elicited using surveys
administered after all treatments. Based on subject choices and survey responses,

33

Relatively hefty punishments were possible because these rounds followed rounds in
which subjects were given opportunities to engage in unpunished collusion and
accumulate winnings. Punishment, however, never exceeded the amount of money gained
from “criminal” activities during the experiment. Thus, the conditions of the experiment
diverge from the assumptions of the tested theories.
34
The experiment does not test the deterrent effects of wrongful conviction.
35
Bribers were randomly matched with “public officials,” and each matched pair engaged
in thirty consecutive rounds with payoffs accumulating over rounds.
36
The probability of sudden death over all rounds was 0.086.

12
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250393

Note: This is an incomplete working draft. Please do not cite without authors’
permission.

the authors concluded that deterrence was driven by severity of the punishment as
opposed to the likelihood of detection.37
3.2. Wrongful Conviction v. Wrongful Acquittal
Basic theories (for example, Png 1986) predict that risk neutral citizens react to
wrongful convictions rates and wrongful acquittal rates in the same way. Rizzolli
and Stanca (2012) conducted an experiment (1) to test Png’s claim, and (2) to study
what might explain disparities in reactions if they exist. They offered three potential
explanations for disparities: risk aversion, loss aversion, and mistaken conviction
aversion.38 Rizzolli and Stanca designed two experimental studies—one withinsubjects and another between-subjects 39 —in which subjects, under various
probabilities of wrongful conviction and acquittal, chose whether (anonymously) to
take money from another randomly matched subject.40 Both subjects in the pair
were given endowments, which were not common knowledge. 41 One subject
decided whether to take a fixed amount, g, from the other. If convicted, the subject
paid a fixed sanction, f, but kept g.42
The results from the within-subject experiment provide mixed support for Png’s
theory. In Treatment 1, subjects (n = 48) faced no chance of a wrongful conviction
or acquittal. All theories predict indifference between taking and not taking. Just
over 29% of subjects took g. In Treatment 2, the probability of a wrongful acquittal
increased to 0.5. In Treatment 3, the probability of a wrongful conviction increased
to 0.5. In Treatment 4, the probability of a wrongful acquittal and a wrongful
37

The authors did not report correlations between individual underestimation of
probabilities and choices over whether to bribe. This would have increased our confidence
in the authors’ conclusion.
38
Aversion to wrongful convictions implies that individuals tend to follow the law because
it is the right thing to do, and not merely because it is optimal for them to abide by the
rules. Thus, wrongful convictions impose a greater cost relative to wrongful acquittals
because they trigger a “loss of guidance” and “motivational crowding out.”
39
The between-subjects experiment rules out order effects. Each subject participated in just
one treatment.
40
No feedback was provided to subjects between rounds in the within-subject experiment.
41
This helps to rule out inequity aversion as an explanation for observed choices. The
authors ran additional tests to determine whether subjects might have assumed all
endowments were the same and acted in a way to avoid inequity in payouts. They find no
evidence of this.
42
Subjects were undergraduate students. All subjects read instructions for both roles and
had to pass a test of understanding to continue. Perfect stranger matching was used from
round to round so that no subject was matched with any other subject more than once.
Each player played the role of the thief in every round and payouts were determined by
randomly choosing which player was the actual thief.
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conviction were 0.25. In all treatments, in line with every theory, the rate of taking
increased substantially relative to treatment 1. Tests of Png’s predictions failed to
offer support. Theft rates were higher when one error rate increased relative to both
(Treatment 2 v. Treatment 4 and Treatment 3 v. Treatment 4). In addition, the theft
rate was higher (at the 10% level) when the wrongful conviction rate increased
alone relative to an increase solely in the wrongful acquittal rate (Treatment 2 v.
Treatment 3). Thus, contrary to Png’s prediction, individuals tend to react
differently to different types and combinations of errors.
Figure 1: Within-Subject Crime Rates from Rizzolli and Stanca (2012)

Rizzolli and Stanca designed Treatments 5 and 6 to separate the three possible
explanations for varying effects of different error types: risk aversion, loss aversion,
and wrongful conviction aversion. Treatment 5 was identical to Treatment 2,
except that the thief received no endowment. Treatment 6 was the same as
Treatment 3, except the thief received an endowment twice as large. Thus,
Treatments 2 and 6 and Treatments 3 and 5 were identical with respect to the
expected gains from theft. In the between-subjects experiment (which controls for
order effects), the crime rate is higher when wrongful conviction alone is possible
relative to only wrongful acquittal, consistent with the within-subjects result. When
the initial endowment is changed to control for expected gains from theft, however,
the difference disappears. This supports risk aversion as an explanation for the
difference in crime rates between Treatments 2 and 3.43 Given evidence suggesting
43

The authors argue that these results also rule out wrongful conviction aversion and loss
aversion as possible explanations for the different outcomes in Treatments 2 and 3.
Presumably, if individuals were averse to wrongful convictions, we should observe
differences between Treatments 2 and 6 and between Treatments 3 and 5 because, even
though the expected marginal gain from taking is the same, individuals would resist taking
when the probability of a wrongful conviction is higher to avoid the disutility that arises
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convicts are risk loving relative to the general population (see, for example, Block
and Gerety 1995), however, evidence in support of theories that assume risk
aversion are of limited use for policy applications.
Figure 2: Between-Subject Crime Rates from Rizzolli and Stanca (2012)

Expected utility expressions indicate marginal gain from stealing given endowment.
T2 and T6 (and T3 and T5) are identical except for probabilities of wrongful
conviction and acquittal.

3.3. Enforcer Choices
Several experiments test predictions related to enforcer choices and the influence
of those choices on crime rates.
Rauhut (2009) was one of the first to predict behavior of citizens and law
enforcers using a game theoretic model assuming risk neutrality. The model
assumes the enforcer pays some fixed cost of detection and earns a positive reward
upon detection, and the citizen receives a payoff upon accomplishing an

from the aversion. Similarly, Rizzolli and Stanca argue that if individuals were loss averse,
we would observe lower crime rates in Treatment 5 relative to Treatment 3 and Treatment
2 relative to Treatment 6. This is not the case, however. Predictions will depend on
whether taking resets one’s reference point. If it does not, then one will always take in
Treatments 3 and 5 (taking avoids the chance of a loss from a wrongful conviction in T3,
and taking provides an opportunity to keep a gain in T5). If it does, then one will never
take in Treatments 3 and 5 (not taking avoids a sure loss in T3 and a chance of a loss in
T5). Although the predictions are flawed, the data fail to support loss aversion.
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undetected taking44 and suffers punishment if detected. The probabilities of crime
and detection arise as Nash equilibrium mixed strategies—the enforcer sets the
detection rate to keep the citizen indifferent between stealing and not stealing, and
the citizen sets the taking rate to keep enforcers indifferent between inspecting and
not inspecting. The model predicts that (1) as punishment severity increases,
enforcers are less likely to expend resources to detect, and (2) severity of
punishment has no effect on crime rates.
Rauhut conducted an experiment to test these predictions. A total of 196
subjects participated in one of ten sessions.45 First, all subjects earned money by
taking a general knowledge quiz.46 Next, all subjects read instructions for roles of
“players” and “inspectors” and were tested for understanding. Each subject was
randomly assigned to the role of player or inspector. After participating in two
practice rounds, each subject engaged in thirty binding rounds. In each round,
each player was anonymously matched with another different player, and both
players could decide to take money from the other. Each player was also matched
with an inspector (a different inspector each round), and each inspector decided
whether to inspect without knowledge of whether the player took from the other
player. In one experiment, punishment was light in periods 1-15 and heavy in
periods 16-30. In a second experiment, punishment was heavy in the first half and
light in the second. After each round, each player learns whether the other player
took from her, whether the inspector inspected and, if she took, whether she was
punished. Each inspector learned whether the player attempted to take. Payoffs
were tallied and accumulated from round to round.
The results generally fail to support the models’ predictions. Given the
parameters chosen, the expected inspection rate was 80% in the low punishment
rounds and 20% in the high punishment rounds. The model predicts that, as
punishment severity changes, the inspector will adjust the inspection rate to keep
the player indifferent between taking and not taking. The expected crime rate,
therefore, was 50% in all rounds (again, partly a function of the parameters
chosen). Static regression results suggest that increasing punishment severity
reduces both inspection (in line with the static prediction) and theft (against the
prediction).47 Rauhut also derived predictions using a dynamic learning model. The
model assumes that subjects begin with initial expectations and update their priors
as they gain experience during the experiment. Figure 3 reports average behavior
44

Transfers due to taking are inefficient in the sense that the payoff to the criminal is some
fraction of the value to the original owner.
45
72% of subjects were female due to their overrepresentation in the subject pool drawn
from students enrolled in the University of Leipzig.
46
This design feature is meant to mitigate house money effects.
47
Rauhut derived estimates using a linear random intercept model, clustering standard
errors on session and subject. Both effects are significant at the 0.1% level.
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(open and closed connected circles) across rounds in Experiment 1 (low
punishment to high punishment) and Experiment 2 (high punishment to low
punishment). The thick grey lines are the static Nash Equilibrium predictions. The
dotted and solid trends represent predictions from two different learning models.48
Citizens seem to react to changes in punishment severity, adjusting theft rates
downward when severity increases and upward when they decrease. The same is
true for inspection rates only when citizens face low punishment severity in the first
rounds and high severity punishment in later rounds. Inspection rates react less
sharply when more severe punishment is meted out in the first rounds, even as theft
rates initially increase.
To summarize, the results support static predictions that increased severity of
punishment lowers inspection rates. Static predictions of stable crime rates are not
supported, however. Dynamic models predict that subjects will react much more
strongly to punishment incentives than they actually do. Adaptation is slower than
predicted. It is possible that over a higher number of rounds, choices would
confirm the dynamic predictions.
Figure 3: Results from Rauhut (2009)
RAUHUT: HIGHER PUNISHMENT, LESS CONTROL?
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Figure 4. Humans learn slowly in the inspection game. The connected points in the upper
figures show crime and in the lower figures inspection rates per period. The thick grey bar
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figures show consistently that humans adapt slower than rational learning models predict.
For low punishment, crime and inspection increases less than expected and for high punishment, crime and inspection decreases less than expected.
48
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4. Discussion and Conclusion
[to come]
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